PDF Download of De Mello, PhD. COLLAPSED. chiaraefrancescofilmcompletodownload Chiaraefrancescofilmcompletodownload. L.Rev. at 279. In David v. Gunter, 382 F.2d at 456, the district court expressly cited the new rule of construction announced by Dean Prosser in the Harvard Law Review article. In Smart v. Jones, 300 Minn. 153, 217 N.W.2d 545, 552, (1974), the supreme court expressed the desire that in later cases “we will continue to follow the construction which we have heretofore placed upon the language of our statute, as we are satisfied that the public interest, welfare and best interests of the state demand it.” However, nothing was said in the David or Smart opinions to indicate that the new rule of construction was intended to be applied prospectively. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by this court in 1970 at rule 3.2(a) specifically adopted the approach of Dean Prosser “that the rule against perpetuities is a rule of construction and not a rule of substantive law.” Whether we shall continue to abide by the cited doctrine was not resolved in this court’s opinion in Smart v. Jones, supra. Moreover, in David v. Gunter, supra, we noted that there was “no necessity at this time to abandon” the rule in this state because we were not then dealing with a case in which the rule may be decisive. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility adopted in 1970, the Minnesota Rules of Court adopted in 1972, and the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice adopted in 1971 constitute the rulebook which we are asked to follow. It is interesting to observe the change of direction between the two groups when the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility adopted in 1970, but the Minnesota Rules of Court and the American Bar Association Project adopted in 1971 adopted the doctrine that the rule against perpetuities was a rule of construction only. This change of direction appears to have taken place because in 1970 the concern for possible conflict with the U.S. Constitution was disregarded and the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that the rule against perpetuities was substantive law. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959). However, even in this revised view of the rule, the majority view still holds that the rule is a presumption of law but, for the reasons just stated, the rule was rejected by the majority when applied to land acquisitions. The majority rule is stated by Dean Wigmore as follows: “* * * The rule is a presumption of law which * * * the courts will ordinarily recognize * * * and which the courts will enforce. The purposes are (1) to prevent * * * the accumulation of a fund at the expense of the general public, (2) to avoid the application of a rule which tends to defeat the ordinary uses of land, (3) to prevent, or at least to lessen, the harm which follows when a rule of law to accumulate a fund for the future is applied to land.” * * * 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2561, at p. 375 (3d ed. 1940). “* * * The rule is a rule of policy, and therefore, so far as the exercise of the power of the judge is concerned, is a rule of construction.” Parke v. Roberts, 11 Ga. 597 (1852). In Webber v. Dudley, 12 Wis.